Informal Credit and Economic Modernization in Milan (1802-1840) by G. De Luca
1. Introduction
The crucial role of banks in modern economic develop-
ment has been argued forcibly by a series of studies that
have now become “classics” and it is one of the mainstays
of the interpretation of nineteenth century industrialization.
Albeit from a variety of positions, emphasizing the impor-
tance of commercial banks or of universal banks, the pre-
sence of banks – legally incorporated (as joint stock
companies) and with statutory rules allowing them to raise
capital and to make long-term investments, what might be
called formal banking – has been considered indispensible for
the progress of industrialization; for Postan, Cameron and
Gerschenkron1, without banks, countries would have not
solved the problem of mobilizing funds and would therefore
have undergone slower economic growth or stagnation.
* Some of the results of this research were presented at session n. 87 “Finan-
cial Intermediation and Economic Growth across the Globe” of the XVIth
World Economic History Congress, Stellenbosch, 9-13 July 2012.
1 See, among others, Cameron R., Banking and Economic Development, Oxford
University Press, New York, 1972, and also, Financing Industrialization, Elgar,
Aldershot, 1992, 2 vol.
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More recently, this correlation has been strengthened by Dou-
glass North’s New Institutional Economics: according to this
perspective, modern banking institutions are able to reduce
transaction costs associated with information asymmetries
and to reduce the friction that exists in capital markets, pro-
ducing benefits for the efficiency of the economic system2. The
considerable prominence of banks in studies of financial hi-
story (as sponsors of company histories and conferences, but
above all for their archives) has also contributed to overesti-
mating the “historic” function of modern banks.
The correlation between banking and growth resulted in
overstating the role of formal credit institutions; banks (or
rather a certain type of nineteenth-century bank) have be-
come a sort of universal paradigm against which to measure
the efficiency or backwardness of any other form of interme-
diation functional for growth.
The Milanese credit system in the first half of the ninete-
enth century is one of the principal victims of this interpre-
tative distortion; it has been dismissed as inefficient and
incomplete both because of the refusal of the city, during the
Napoleonic period, to accept the proposal of the governing
authorities to create a central authority for note-issue, and
because of its failure over the following decades to develop
formally incorporated banks3. However, an interpretation
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2 Cfr. D.C. North, “Transaction costs in history”, in The Journal of European Eco-
nomic history, v. 14, 1985, 3, pp. 557-576; Id., Istituzioni, cambiamento istituzionale,
evoluzione dell’economia, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1994, pp. 23-32.
3 Cfr. G. Piluso, “Regole, istituzioni, mercati: modelli e innovazioni istituzionali
a Milano dalla Restaurazione all’Unità”, in G. Conti, T. Fanfani (eds.), Regole e
mercati: fiducia, concorrenza e innovazioni finanziarie nella storia creditizia italiana,
Edizioni Plus, Pisa, 2002, pp. 67-86.
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that condemns financial systems as inadequate or lacking
formal institutions – phenomena that belong to a later period
(i.e. central banks) or are characteristics of different contexts
(i.e. the modern banks) – is like judging a fish from how it
copes when out of water.
On the theoretical side, neo-institutionalists themselves
attribute a central role in financial intermediation to informal
institutions and rules (consisting only of informal con-
straints, “not enforceable by law”)4 and to personal relations
of trust, whilst, in terms of archive materials, the work of
Hoffman, Postel-Vinay and Rosenthal provide convincing
evidence of the importance of alternative organizational ar-
rangements, centred in particular on notaries5: theoretical
conclusions and empirical results that reveal the limited ra-
tionality of modern banking systems and encourage analysis
based on archive evidence.
This paper intends to present a more thorough recon-
struction of the Milanese credit market in the first half of the
nineteenth century than has been attempted hitherto, iden-
tifying its real actors – both those informally6 involved in
loan activities (i.e. without specific juridical status) and those
organized into specific institutions – and their interplay.
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4 D.C. North, Transaction Costs in History, cit., p. 559.
5 P.T. Hoffman, G. Postel-Vinay, J.L. Rosenthal, Priceless Markets. The Political
Economy of Credit in Paris, 1660-1870, Chicago, UCP, 2000.
6 Pietro Cafaro has put forward striking interpretations on the informal nature
of the credit system in Lombardy: “Alle origini del sistema bancario lombardo:
casse di risparmio e banchieri privati (1860-1880)”, in Banche e reti di banche
nell’Italia postunitaria, vol. II: Formazione e sviluppo di mercati locali del credito,
edited by G. Conti, S. La Francesca, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2000, pp. 437-441.
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After a brief description of the data used, the focus of the
paper is on the effectiveness of the credit system based on a
close network of family and professional relations, as well
as friendship, in which the major role is played by non-pro-
fessional lenders, such as religious bodies, ecclesiastical and
lay entities, and private lenders. These networks were very
resilient, and this was made possible by the essential role of
notaries, who offered increasing returns thanks to the accu-
mulation and distribution of information, initiating a process
of path-dependence which had considerable impact on the
first wave of banks created after the Unification of Italy.
Finally, I give some preliminary evidence that this infor-
mal credit network was complementary both to the activi-
ties of private bankers who – in the form of individual
companies – mainly dealt with short-term loans for silk ma-
nufacturing (discounting bills of exchange with two signa-
tures), and to the activity of the Cassa di Risparmio [Savings
Bank] in Milan; while the bank, founded in 1823, made
long-term loans against the collateral of land, the galaxy of
informal lenders, via notaries, financed the collateral of clas-
ses and entrepreneurs with less secure guarantees. Their re-
liability was established not on the security of property but
by the capital of information circulating in the network of
relations.
2. The Data
The research is based on the notarized deeds of Milan.
Firstly – since there are no inventories or tax records that
might yield selective or consistent information about loans
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Secondly, the activity of some notaries in Milan has been
traced vertically in order to reconstruct “concatenated
deeds”, providing important information which would
otherwise be lost, and enabling the real meaning of each do-
cument to be investigated, offering – when taken together –
a rich tapestry of information; a sample has been singled out
of twenty notaries; they were active between the end of the
eighteenth and the mid nineteenth centuries. And since
some of these transactions went beyond the city, the deeds
of notaries in other locations within the network (Sondrio,
Brescia, Bergamo) are also being investigated via samples of
documents.
and debts – a “horizontal” picture has been built up of the
overall activities of notaries in the city in certain benchmark
years: this investigation is not yet complete so this data is
based on the records of 1825, 1830, 1835 and 1840. The star-
ting point is 1825 because the only formal banking institu-
tion active in Milan, albeit with its own statute, the Cassa di
Risparmio, was opened in 1823. The total number of acts and
notarized debt/credit transactions (of financial dealings in
general) are shown in the table 1.
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TABLE 1
Total acts and debt/credit acts







1825 45 3,810 1,096 28,7
1830 44 3,780 892 23,6
1835 51 4,834 1,378 28,5
1840 56 5,478 1,752 31,5
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3. The growth of the “informal credit system”
during the Italian Republic (1802-1805) and
Kingdom of Italy (1805-1814)
The closing of the Monte di Santa Teresa, the Monte Sete
and Monte di Pietà, following the arrival of French troops
and the establishment of the Cisalpine Republic in 1796,
created a huge void in the Milanese credit system; the first
of them – originally set up to pay off the public debt inheri-
ted from the Banco di Sant’Ambrogio7 for the purpose of re-
ducing the dependence of imperial finances on local lenders
– substantially assisted the Monte Sete throughout the pe-
riod of Habsburg reforms because of its relative lack of ef-
fectiveness in commercial discounting (i.e. advance
payments on goods and securities) to local businessmen. The
Monte di Pietà, on the other hand, alongside free pawn
loans, acted as a pawnbroker for sums over 30 lire, at an in-
terest rate of 5%, carrying out a task defined by a contempo-
rary observer as “a public good that favours commerce”8.
To offset the effects of shutting down these institutes, in-
formal lending became increasingly important and the net-
work of non-institutionalized providers became the principal
source of capital. This system of financial exchange – which
had existed in Milan and all pre-industrial societies for some
time – took root rapidly in the second half of the eighteenth
century; with the publication of Dell’impiego del denaro [On
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7 See A. Cova, Il Banco di Sant’Ambrogio nell’economia milanese dei secoli XVII e
XVIII, Giuffré, Milan, 1972.
8 See Archivio di Stato, Milan (hereafter Asm), Commercio, ancient part (here-
after pa), cart. 64, “Project for the re-opening of Monte de’ pegni”, undated;
the pawnbroker was closed from 1796 to 1804.
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the Use of Money] by Scipione Maffei (1744) and the establi-
shment of the Papal Bull Vix pervenit (1745), in Milan, as el-
sewhere, the question of the legitimacy of interest-yielding
loans had been approved in the teeth of religious opposition
to trading money; this moral emancipation coincided signi-
ficantly with the evolution of a formal definition of a deed of
loan (replacing the dissembling obligationes, consensus presti-
tus), which at this time began to feature prominently in the
acts of notaries9, while, from the end of the 1770s, the cur-
rency stability created by the reform of 1778 and the gradual
rise in the interest rate made investments in the money mar-
ket particularly attractive. The more than 28 million Milanese
lire reimbursed in cash to the holders of public debt genera-
ted an enormous amount of additional liquidity which boo-
sted the provision of credit from private individuals10.
Significantly – although not necessarily a more generalized
trend – two Milanese notaries increasingly drew up docu-
ments for interpersonal loans which rose from 25-30% of total
deeds in the middle of the century to 40-60% in 1775-8011.
With the rapid upturn in commercial and manufacturing
activity in the city, after the establishment of the French re-
gime, private, interpersonal relations between those involved
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9 See for example the following notary records: Asm, Rubriche notai, cart. 2893,
notary Antonio Maggi (1700-1753), cart. 309, notary Antonio Aureggi (1719-
1766), cart. 93, notary Pietro Francesco Alberganti (1726-1749).
10 See S. Zaninelli, “Un capitolo centrale del riordino dei tributi indiretti dello
Stato di Milano nella seconda metà del ‘700: la ‘redenzione delle regalie’”, in
Studi in onore di Antonio Petino, I. Momenti e problemi di storia economica, Univer-
sità di Catania, 1986, pp. 334 ss.
11 See Asm, Notarile, cart. 3775, notary Marco Antonio Pizzigalli; Notary re-
cords, cart. 311, notary Carlo Giuseppe Aureggi.
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in trading money and those privy to credit circuits, between
those who had money and those who needed it, became the
main channel by which information on the availability of
money, its cost and the reliability of borrowers, circulated in
a city that was reorganizing and expanding.
The costs of the allocation and provision of capital, which
“comes flowing from everywhere to liven industry and
trade” – in the words of Melchiorre Gioia12 – were absorbed
by the network of relationships which had the fundamental
function of passing on information effectively and cheaply.
This network became increasingly articulated, bringing the
various credit circuits of the city together, and becoming the
backbone of Milan’s credit system.
Within this framework, a group of merchant bankers
emerged (about fifty), specializing in trading money (also
internationally), at the top of the credit pyramid with its nu-
merous different strata. These merchant bankers were pro-
minent individuals and banking partnerships (Bignami,
Carozzi, Balabio e Besana, Frapolli e Besana, Decio, Carlo
Ciani, fratelli Prinetti, Tommaso Carli)13, whose addresses
(along the streets radiating from Porta Romana, Porta
Orientale and Porta Nuova) were well known to city dwel-
lers and became part of the image of Milan14; they lent
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12 M. Gioia, Discussione economica sul Dipartimento d’Olone, Milano, 1903,
p. 118.
13 See S. Levati and his seminal research on Milanese bankers, their specializa-
tion, relations and upward social mobility: La nobiltà del lavoro. Negozianti e ban-
chieri a Milano tra Ancien Régime e Restaurazione, FrancoAngeli, Milan, 1997.
14 See Asm, Commercio, modern part (hereafter pm), cart. 9, “Nota delle prin-
cipali case di Banchieri, commercianti e manifatturieri di Milano”, 12 October
1807; Archivio Storico della Camera di Commercio di Milano (hereafter Accm),
box 83, Statistics, folder 2.
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money and invested in important commercial and military
transactions, as well as handling commercial bills, an indi-
spensable role in facilitating transactions between distant
marketplaces. Milan, at the center of trade in Lombardy,
was one of the hubs of the extensive network of bankers and
foreign exchange dealers spread throughout Europe, with
stable financial relations with Amsterdam, Antwerp, Aug-
sburg, London, Vienna, Lyons and Paris. At the same time,
the role of foreign exchange agents also increased with bro-
kering – for a 1% commission – “bills of exchange, foreign
exchange and other endorsable papers”, evidence of the
growing intensity of the network and of the increasing use
of financial products in ever broader levels. Twelve were
mentioned by the Servitore di Piazza in 1789, 28 in 1804. Their
accounting records, which the regulations of 177015 required
them to keep for all brokerage transactions, are evidence of
loans and endorsements, and the fact that they handed
down their expertise from one generation to the next helped
to consolidate their role and intensify the existing network
of relations.
During this period, however, more and more evidently,
notaries played a central role in the functioning of the pri-
vate credit market; not so much being themselves as the
source of capital, even though they did not shun this oppor-
tunity16, but as hubs of information, above all concerning the
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15 See Asm, Commercio pa, cart. 27, memorandum dated 20 March 1770.
16 In 1801, the notary public Giovanni Battista Alberganti lent the merchant
Paolo Antonio Sirtori 4,000 lire for 3 years at 6% per annum “under the agreed
security of signor Francesco Baldironi”, Asm, Notarile ultimi versamenti, cart.
542, notary public Sacchi Giorgio.
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loans provided by private individuals, non-specialist insti-
tutions and other non-professional organizations.
In all financial transactions, the key question was how
lenders and borrowers obtained information about each
other17; in the course of their activities, notaries naturally had
access to confidential information about the finances (or fi-
nancial needs) of their clients; they knew whether they had
cash to lend, if they had recently sold or bought property, if
they were reliable business partners and prompt payers or
if they were close to bankruptcy or needed to sell their assets
quickly. In managing this information about reputation, no-
taries had micro-economic incentives in terms of retaining
or increasing their client base, and provided accurate infor-
mation and references. The quantitative analysis of this phe-
nomenon is not yet complete but the case of the Milanese
notary Ignazio Baroggi and the loan contracted by Gaetano
Battaglia in 1802 is exemplary: to meet the needs of the latter,
a colonel in Napoleon’s army and majority partner in his fa-
ther’s firm, 15,000 lire were required to finance the com-
pany’s trade in leather goods. The notary drew up a contract
of loan – for 3 years at 5.5% – with some of his clients “who
had capital on hand”, an engineer, Giovanni Cogliati of
Milan, Onofrio Camocino of Cremona and Antonia Fuma-
galli, the widow of Fortunato Radice, giving the lenders as-
surances about the Battaglia family, being “esteemed
merchants”18. The details in the possession of notaries about
the reputation of potential borrowers reduced the risks of in-
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17 See P.T. Hoffman, G. Postel-Vinay, J.-L. Rosenthal, Priceless Markets. The Po-
litical Economy of Credit in Paris, 1660-1870.
18 Asm, Notarile, cart. 49730, 1802, 5 January.
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formation being inaccurate (and hence distortions from
moral hazard and adverse selection) and enabled this capital
market to flourish.
Notaries interested as intermediaries in credit also
sought to obtain the trust of bankers and specialists; Cristo-
foro Caimi devoted himself “entirely to notaries” after a ca-
reer as “lawyer during the Kingdom of Italy in the Court of
commerce” and after “rapidly obtaining the confidence of
primary bankers and merchants”19.
Thus, their homes became the principal focus for the flow
of information in the city and not only the city, turning sa-
vings into investments for a wide-ranging sector of society
inside and outside Milan. Studies carried out by Ignazio Ba-
roggi, Girolamo Lombardi, Pietro Lonati, Antonio Maderna
and Giorgio Sacchi, which deal with some areas of Porta Ver-
cellina, Porta Ticinese and Porta Orientale between 1801 and
1808, show that loans were not only provided and taken out
by bankers, merchants, entrepreneurs and specialist emplo-
yees of ecclesiastical bodies (such as la Fabbrica del Duomo,
which maintained Milan Cathedral, and the main city ho-
spital, the Ospedale Maggiore), landowners, patricians, of-
ficers and Ministers of State, but also widows, single women,
physicists, engineers, bookkeepers and priests in Milan, Bre-
scia, Cremona, and also as far away as Modena and Ferrara,
using property, future inheritances and even theatre boxes
at La Scala as collateral.
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19 The quotation is from S. Levati, “Ricostruzione prosopografica e fonte nota-
rile. Metodi e limiti per uno studio dell’élite mercantile milanese”, in Nouvelles
aproches de la documentation notariale et histoire urbaine. Le cas italien (XVIIe- XIXe
siècle), in “Mélanges de l’École Française de Rome. Italie et Méditerranée”,
tome 112, 1, 2000, p. 227-241.
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This system provided landowners and the wealthy with
money at 6% interest (from loans lasting, on average, 3.8
years in the period from 1802-14) to build new houses in the
country, enlarge their existing homes, irrigate their land or
provide a dowry, or entrepreneurial money at 5-5.5% interest
(from loans lasting, on average, 4.4 years) to finance their
businesses. The money was allocated less on the basis of the
price than the information provided free or at low cost20; ma-
king it possible – as we have seen – to bring a group of len-
ders together for a particularly large loan; and creating a
fairly stable market (able to withstand sudden ups and
downs), as can be deduced by the fact that private loans
were also frequently sold to third parties21, making them ne-
gotiable.
This development in the credit market then met with the
modernizing initiatives of Napoleon, beginning in the years
of the Italian Republic and intended to create a central di-
scounter and issuer of paper money. In view of the elasticity
of the Milanese system, the failure to establish this central
authority was not due to the supposed backwardness of the
local credit structure, as has been argued, or its inability to
understand the importance of such an institution; rather, it
was due to the reluctance of those in the market to lose their
independence to an improved and regulated discounting sy-
stem – such as would have been the case if an issuing bank
had been created – which, however, would not have been
properly tailored to the needs of the local market.
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20 Only the official brokers (named sensali) received a monetary fee for their
intermediation.
21 See for example those of 20 February 1802 and 15 March 1806 in Asm, No-
tarile, cart. 49730, notary Ignazio Baroggi.
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4. The informal supply of credit and the Cassa di
Risparmio of Milan (1815-1840)
During the period of the return of the Austrian Empire,
from 1815 to 1840, two new actors came onto the scene in
Milan’s credit market.
First, the so-called “merchants in banking and silk”, a ca-
tegory of specialist institutional brokers, who prospered from
the 1820s onwards due to the massive expansion of the silk
“industry” (cultivation and throwing); for such an expansion,
credit was indispensable, especially in the form of working
capital, given the lack of heavy investment in fixed assets,
and this group of operators joined the credit market making
use of advances and deferred payments; in the 1830s about
thirty such brokers were registered with the Chamber of
Commerce in Milan, their fates being determined largely by
the macroeconomic trend in silk, an essential raw material,
mainly exported in the form of spun thread22. Compared to
them, with their access to large foreign markets, local produ-
cers could do little and were obliged to accept high loan costs,
around 6%, unless they pawned their silk (and thereby lost
the opportunity to sell it when the price was highest).
Second, the Cassa di Risparmio (Savings Bank), opened
in Milan in 1823 by the government based on the model of
the Austrian Sparkasse23. It was a philanthropic institution,
INFORMAL CREDIT AND ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION IN MILAN (1802-1840)
223JEEH • 2013
22 See A. Moioli, “Il commercio serico lombardo nella prima metà dell’Otto-
cento”, in S. Cavaciocchi (ed.), La seta in Europa (sec. XIII-XX), Le Monnier, Flo-
rence, 1993.
23 See A.M. Galli, “L’Ottocento”, vol. I, in A. Cova, A.M. Galli, Finanza e sviluppo
economico locale. La Cassa di Risparmio delle province Lombarde dalla fondazione al
1940, Laterza, Milan-Rome-Bari, 1991, pp. 1-84.
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created because of concern over the continuous fall in the
price of leading agricultural produce, as well as the lack of a
credit institution in the territory able to properly safeguard
the savings of the lower classes. After the failure, between
1819 and 1821, to set up a branch of the Austrian National
Bank, able to issue banknotes, act as a pawnbroker for silk,
and a bank for discounting and circulation, the Cassa di Ri-
sparmio was the only formal banking institution in Milan
(with branches in all the main cities of Lombardy) until the
Unification of Italy in 1861.
If the merchants in banking and silk had a well-defined
and specialist client base – silk producers – providing short-
term loans (2-6 months) and advances via internal agree-
ments and contracts, the Cassa di Risparmio was a bank
which, on the sides of both supply and demand, rivalled the
city’s informal credit system. Although deposits were sup-
posed to be motivated by the essentially philanthropic aim
of the bank, the Cassa paid 4% interest on savings accounts
(in line with the equivalent Austrian institution) and provi-
ded loans to private individuals and charitable entities at
4.5% interest, against real-estate guarantees.
Comparing some data from notaries in the period 1825-
40 (shown in table 2, net of the loans provided by the Cassa
and by private bankers, which for the whole period range
between 5 and 7% of the total) with data for the Cassa in the
same period, some interesting facts emerge about the rela-
tionship between the institutional credit system and the
city’s informal one.
In 1825, the Cassa, opened only two years previously, had
2,691,000 Austrian lire in deposits, but the overwhelming ma-
jority of savers, despite the declared aims of the bank, were
GIUSEPPE DE LUCA
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not from the lower classes; mortgage loans were provided to
the sum of 872,000 lire24. Notarized loans, on the other hand,
totalled 8.5 million lire, with an interest rate in 65% of cases
of 5% and a duration in 40% of cases of 3 years; about 40% of
the capital came from the nobility and professionals, 27%
from religious bodies and ecclesiastic entities and 14% from
women; the sales of loans – at par value – to third parties
show how the market was able to meet immediate needs for
liquidity and amounted to over 1.5 million lire.
Five years later, deposits in the bank had risen to 4.5 mil-
lion lire and mortgage loans to 1.4 million25; but it was the
year of the revolution in Paris, news of which spread quickly
to Lombardy, generating a sense of mistrust that directly im-
pacted on the notaries’ credit market, too. Within this mar-
ket, total and average loan amounts fell, the average interest
rate rose slightly, and the number of sales of loans increased
sharply (47%), evidence of uncertainty in the last five
months of the year in Milan and of the presence of capitalists
looking for safe investments.
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24 See A.M. Galli, L’Ottocento, pp. 37-41.
25 Ibid., p. 51.
TABLE 2
Notarized loans (net of loans drawn up for bankers and




















1825 648 8,540,005 13,180 4.8 3.15 178 1,541,480 8,660
1830 580 5,373,940 9,893 4.9 3.05 345 2,265,270 6,566
1835 959 10,081,967 10,513 4.7 3.04 191 1,037,894 5,434
1840 1367 12,100,050 8,851 4.6 3.04 187 1,004,003 5,369
Source: data constructed from the notary deeds listed in the Archive References.
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Between 1835 and 1840 – in a situation of an expanding,
modernizing regional economy and industry with intensi-
fied realignment of agriculture and trading activities – de-
posits at the Cassa (almost entirely from Milan) increased
from 6.7 to 8.3 million lire, whilst mortgage loans rose from
4.5 to 6.5 million26. Loans from notaries were up from 10 to
12 million lire, almost double the amount of loans provided
by the bank, whilst their average size had fallen sharply
(with interest rates also decreasing very slightly).
Substantially, the Cassa – far from being the refuge and
safe haven of small savers – had raised capital from the we-
althy and from the nobility; the loans granted at 4-4.5% were
mostly in the amounts of 20,000 or 50,000 lire (but also 26%
between 50,000 and 100,000), and with a duration of 6-10
years; loans were made outside the town, to hospitals and
social institutions, to large landowning families (Durini,
D’Adda, Serbelloni, Belgioioso, …), able to provide solid se-
curity in the form of properties which were fairly and scru-
pulously valued27.
In a complementary way, the informal provision of loans
shifted towards a more varied and less reliable but far more
enterprising social group; loans were on average smaller and
tailored to specific needs for initiatives, without land gua-
rantees properly covering the loan amount, whose place was
taken by the information about reputation provided by in-
formal networks and personal relations. What these opera-
tors paid over and above the rate offered by the Cassa was
no more than half a percent. Traditionally, loans had been
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26 Ibid., p. 65.
27 Ibid., pp. 48-83-84.
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provided for property and family reasons (dowries, inheri-
tance, religious benefactions), but now they went largely to
industrial and commercial projects, including all the large-
scale enterprises in Milan and Lombardy in the 1830s and
1840s: sugar producers, shipping and insurance companies,
mechanical engineering firms, textiles, pharmaceuticals and
trade in colonial items.
At the same time, informal loan providers were also
changing identity: alongside the nobility, in 1840 the top po-
sition was occupied by charitable and ecclesiastical institu-
tions, with 31% of the total. In other cities, this figure was
even higher: mid-century, Vienna asked for a loan from the
Lombard-Veneto ecclesiastical authorities because it had “re-
marked that among charitable entities with large amounts
of capital, Church Trustees and the like are prominent”; in
Brescia the sum invested by these institutions in loans
amounted to over 9 million Austrian lire, and a further over
23 million to private individuals28.
Perhaps fierce competition from this loan activity, based
on informal and private networks and also mobilizing forced
savings (made up of dowries, bequests by religious institu-
tions, charity donations), made it difficult to “institutionalize”
credit, leaving a difficult market for modern banks.
5. Concluding remarks
In Milan, the world of non-institutionalized credit, popu-
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lated by noblemen, the bourgeoisie, merchants, ecclesiastical
bodies and religious entities – typical for the early modern
age – expanded rapidly from the last decades of the eighte-
enth century; the flow of money from the redemption of pu-
blic debt placed in the hands of thousands of subscribers with
fresh capital that was invested in an economy undergoing
deep transformation. Notaries emerged as the backbone of
this market, not only as certifiers of the legality of loan agree-
ments: thanks to the rich store of information accumulated
from their clients and increasing income from the successful
completion of transactions, they progressively, reliably and
efficiently, intermediated supply and demand for credit.
With the French presence and the consequent liquidation
of the few existing financial organizations (Monte di Santa
Teresa, Monte di Pietà), the range of the unofficial credit
market widened, contributing to a new social balance; alon-
gside notaries, networks of relatives, local and professional
relations were built up, creating a mechanism of trust and
for verifying reputations which constituted the social base
for the provision of credit29.
On this basis, notaries were able to serve a large portion
of society in Milan, including the lower classes; it can be esti-
mated that in 1840 almost a fifth of the households in the city
had obtained notarized loans; using consolidated informa-
tion rather than generic guarantees and collateral, these in-
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termediaries moved large sums and provided medium and
long-term finance for the more modernised entrepreneurial
activities, which the Cassa di Risparmio was not willing or
able to fund. This bank, which did not have the same detai-
led information available, worked on the basis of the scru-
pulous evaluation of property used as collateral and hence
ended up lending only to aristocratic landowners and city
authorities. As in France, examined by Hoffmann, Postel-
Vinay and Rosenthal, in Milan too, the bank was no substi-
tute for notaries, “if anything, they were complementary”30.
The two sides of the credit world, formal and informal, coe-
xisted, complementing each other and, later, crossing over
into the terrain normally occupied by the other; after 1861,
much of the detailed information provided by notaries and
the ability to monitor informal credit networks, became wor-
king methods adopted by the banks.
This does not mean that, compared to the evolution of
new banking institutions able to bring together liquidity and
risk pooling, notaries who dealt only in information, were
not, in fact, making the best of an old job31; it merely suggests
that an interpretation of credit transformation from the old
regime to the industrial age is inadequate; the new banks
that emerged did not, nor did they wish to, wholly replace
conventional credit mechanisms, but moved parallel to them
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and learned significantly from them; similarly, before the
emergence of the new banks, financial innovation and credit
activities were often carried out informally and privately,
also fostering progress and economic modernization32.
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